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ABSTRACT 
Between 1890 and 2004, total factor productivity (TFP) growth in the United States 
has been strongly procyclical, while labor productivity growth has been mildly so. This 
chapter argues that these results are not simply a statistical artifact, as Mathew Shapiro 
and others have argued.  Procyclicality results principally from demand shocks 
interacting with capital services which are relatively invariant over the cycle.  This 
account contrasts with that offered by the real business cycle (RBC) program, which 
attributes economic cycles to technology shocks as measured by deviations in TFP from 
trend.   
Introduction 
Between 1890 and 2004, total factor productivity (TFP) growth in the United 
States has been strongly procyclical, while labor productivity growth has been mildly 
so. The paper argues that these results are not simply a statistical artifact, as Mathew 
Shapiro and others have argued.  Procyclicality results  principally from demand 
shocks interacting with capital services which are relatively invariant over the cycle.  
This account contrasts with that offered by the real business cycle (RBC) program, 
which attributes economic cycles to technology shocks as measured by deviations in 
TFP from trend.  In real business cycle models causality runs entirely from the side of 
aggregate supply.  
The difficulty with the RBC approach is that TFP does not just experience 
retardation in its growth rate during recessions.  It declines. TFP not only declined 
between  1929 and 1933, it has declined during  almost every economic downturn 
since 1890.  There are conceivably adverse supply shocks that could account for this, 
although such events are historically quite unusual. Since the statistical results 
themselves cannot ultimately tell us which process is producing such declines,  
narrative history, at its best integrating the analysis of qualitative and quantitative 
data, plays a critical role in efforts to persuade that one or the other of these 
explanatory frameworks is preferable. The challenge for RBC proponents is  to 
provide plausible accounts for why TFP declines in most downturns.     
1. The Evidence for Procyclical TFP
In several papers I have documented the high rate of TFP growth across the 
Depression years and considered its causes and implications for understanding US 
economic growth in this and other periods (Field, 2003, 2006a,b, 2007b, 2009a).  A 
byproduct of this work has been the finding that total factor productivity growth was 
strongly procyclical during the Depression years (Field, 2008).  When the 
unemployment rate went up, the level of TFP went down, and vice versa.  How 
generalizable is the phenomenon of Depression era TFP procyclicality?  The answer 
is striking.  Similar regression analyses show that for over a century TFP growth in 
the United States has been strongly procyclical.  The elasticity of TFP growth with 
respect to a change in the unemployment rate has been remarkably stable in the years 
both before and after the Second World War and in a variety of subperiods during 
which trend growth rates of TFP were quite different.1   
The evidence for the persistence of procyclical TFP and the stability of its 
empirical significance comes from a series of regressions of the change in the natural 
log of TFP (∆TFP) on the change in the unemployment rate in percentage points 
(∆UR): 
∆TFP = α + β ∆UR + µ 
The estimated constant term in the equation (α ) can be interpreted as an 
estimate of the trend growth rate of TFP over the period studied.  The coefficient (β) 
describes the relationship between the TFP growth rate and the change in the 
unemployment rate, and is thus a measure of cyclicality.   
The regressions reported in Table 1 have two striking features.   First, the 
coefficients on the change in the unemployment rate all lie within a tight range 
bounded by -.83 for the post-World War II era (equation 1.8) and  -1.03 for the entire 
period from 1890 to 2004 (equation 1.10).2  Over more than a century TFP was 
strongly procyclical and in a remarkably consistent fashion:  a fall in the 
unemployment rate by one percentage point led to an increase in the growth rate of 
TFP of about 0.9 percent per year.  The strong procyclical relationship holds across 
all time periods, even the World War II years, despite the fact that nearly half of all 
production went to the military and there were shortages and rationing in the civilian 
sector (Higgs, 1992).   The size of the procyclicality coefficient does not depend on 
whether one is close to potential output or substantially below it.  A comparison of 
Equations 1.10 and 1.11 shows that inclusion of the level of unemployment (UR), 
along with its rate of change (∆UR) has little effect on the originally estimated 
coefficient. 
These equations provide the empirical grounds for concluding that procyclical 
TFP growth has been a persisting characteristic of the US economy for over a century 
and that the magnitude of the cyclicality effect has been relatively stable.   It is 
striking that the estimates pre- and post- World War II are so similar.  Although 
Kendrick felt comfortable publishing annual TFP estimates, Kuznets worried about 
the use of his early national income estimates for cyclical analysis, primarily because 
of unease about the inventory investment series he had constructed.3  There are many 
ways in which inaccurate data might lead to spurious conclusions. But if the process 
producing short run procyclicality was similar pre- and postwar, and if there was 
simply more noise in the prewar data, we might have expected the estimated prewar 
relationship to be weaker.  It is not. 
The second striking feature of  Table 1 is substantial variation in growth rates 
across different historical epochs, a finding common in the work of pioneers in the 
study of TFP growth rates such as Abramovitz (1956).   The trend growth rates 
represented by the estimates of the constant term vary from a low of 0.53 percent per 
year during the dismal age from 1973 to 1995 (equation 1.7) to 1.95 during the 
golden era from 1948 to 1973 (equation 1.6) to a high of 2.83 percent per year in the 
Depression years from 1929 to 1941 (equation 1.1).  
Running separate regressions across different subperiods whose demarcations 
reflect judgment contrasts with the ahistorical and mechanical use of the Hodrick-
Prescott filter in real business cycle studies.  Kehoe and Prescott (2008, pp. 9-10), for 
example, “view the increase in the stock of useful knowledge … as exogenous. Our 
view is that this stock increases smoothly over time and is not country-specific.”4  
The variation in trend growth rates identified in these different regressions is 
consistent with a contrasting view that the arrival of economically important 
innovations may be quite discontinuous, and cluster in particular epochs, rendering 
some periods more technologically progressive than others.   
2.  Procyclicality in TFP and Output per Hour 
Interest in the procyclicality of TFP, as opposed to other measures of 
productivity, like output per labor hour, is recent.5   Since the 1960s and the work of 
Hultgren (1960), Eckstein and Wilson (1964), and Kuh (1965), however, empirical 
macroeconomists have taken it as a stylized fact that the growth of labor productivity 
is procyclical:6  the growth rate of output per hour (like TFP) is negatively related to 
changes in the unemployment rate.  The majority of these studies deal with data from 
manufacturing, but Gordon (1979; 1993, p. 275) makes the claim more generally for 
the private nonfarm economy.   
Table 2 explores the cyclicality of output per hour and related measures as well 
as their long run growth paths. Its regressions replace the TFP growth rate in Table 1 
with other dependent variables, including the growth rates of output per hour, the 
capital/labor ratio, hours, capital, output per unit of capital, and total output.   The 
results show first (equations 2.1-2.4) that although output per hour, like TFP, is 
procyclical, the relationship between its growth rate and the change in the 
unemployment rate is weaker, and for the period after 1973 (equation 2.3), one cannot 
reject the hypothesis of acyclicality.  In an arithmetic sense, the procyclicality of 
labor productivity is due to the fact that the response of output to a change in the 
unemployment rate (equations 2.18-20) is stronger than the response of hours 
(equations 2.9-11).   
Whereas both output and hours change systematically with a change in the 
unemployment rate, the coefficient in the capital growth rate equation is so small that 
the growth rate in capital appears to be acyclical (equations 2.12.-14).  Why?  There 
are substantial lead times in acquiring some types of producer durables (aircraft, for 
example) as well as virtually all categories of structures (factories, warehouses, 
houses, and any type of infrastructure).  These long gestation periods, in which 
projects are completed in an uncertain future and where the strength of aggregate 
demand down the road can only be guessed at the time the projects are begun, is part 
of the explanation. It is true that optimism in expansions tends to boost planned 
investment, but central banks often attempt to lean against the wind by raising interest 
rates and dampening enthusiasm.     Cyclical fluctuations in the cost of materials and 
availability of construction labor can also make recessions attractive times in which to 
initiate expensive projects, and curb them during booms. That said, there is a slight 
negative correlation between the unemployment rate and an index of gross private 
investment spending, but it is too weak to influence the overall acyclicality of the 
capital stock numbers, from which our estimates of service flow are drawn (see 
Section 3).7 
The acyclicality of capital combined with the procylicality of hours means that 
during expansions, labor hours grow more than capital, so that the capital-labor ratio 
is countercyclical (equations 2.5-8).   If the capital labor ratio were all that changed in 
an expansion, its decline should cause the marginal product of labor to fall.8  This 
effect operating in isolation would mean that output per hour should fall as the 
unemployment rate falls.  Since the results in Equations 2.1 through 2.4 in Table 2 
show the opposite, some other factor must be counterbalancing the fall in the 
capital/labor ratio in an expansion.   
Labor hoarding is the most common explanation for why labor productivity 
rises with declines in unemployment  (see, e.g. Hall, 1988, p. 929). As Christina 
Romer puts it, “Firms tend to be slow to fire workers in bad years and slow to hire 
workers in good years” (1986, p. 6).  Because of fixed costs associated with turnover 
and hiring, firms retain labor during downturns and seek increased work intensity per 
man hour during upturns.  The rise in intensity of work is not initially reflected by 
increases in employment or hours,  and the consequence is that output rises more 
rapidly than hours as unemployment declines.    
The dynamics of employment, hours, and output are, however, more complex 
than the labor hoarding story suggests.   During the  postwar period, for example, 
firms typically completed the more intensive exploitation of already hired labor well 
before the end of an expansion.  In the last one or two years before a peak, they 
tended to hire additional workers at a rapid rate.    Robert Gordon (1979, 1993) 
suggests that this “end-of-expansion” effect  slows growth in output per hour and 
attenuates the overall pro-cyclicality of labor productivity. Since the growth of capital 
is acyclical, the end-of-expansion effect causes the  capital-labor ratio to decline as 
one completes recovery from recession.   The resulting downward pressure on the 
marginal product of labor  helps explain why the procyclicality of output per hour is 
weaker than that of TFP.    
The competing roles of TFP growth and capital shallowing in influencing the 
cyclicality of output per hour can be illustrated using the Solow growth accounting 
framework, often used to decompose the growth rate in output per hour (y – n) in the 
long run into the sum of the TFP growth rate (a) plus capital’s share (β) times the 
growth rate in the capital/labor ratio ((k – n): 
   y – n = α + β (k – n) 
The equation can also be used to explore the influences on the cyclicality of 
growth in output per hour by differentiating with respect to a change in the 
unemployment rate.  Tables 1 and 2 establish empirically the signs of the relevant 
relationships.  First, d(y-n)/d(UR) is negative – when the unemployment rate declines, 
the rate of growth of output per hour rises.  Second, dα/d(UR) is negative – when the 
unemployment rate declines, the TFP growth rate rises (Table 1)  Finally, d(β (k – 
n))/d(UR) is positive: when the unemployment rate declines, the growth rate of the 
capital labor ratio declines (I ignore here any cyclical influences on capital’s share).    
 When the unemployment rate falls as the economy comes out of recession, the 
fall in the capital labor ratio tends to reduce growth in output per hour while 
procyclical TFP advance tends to increase it.   During the period 1890-2004, for 
example, reductions in the unemployment rate by one percent were associated with 
increases of 0.5 percent in the growth rate of output per man hour (equation 2.4).   
This is a slower rate than the average TFP rise of 0.83 percent associated with a one 
percent decline in the unemployment rate.  Assuming that the capital share (β)  is 
0.22, the decomposition suggests that this difference is driven by a fall in the growth 
rate of the capital/labor ratio of 1.5 percent per year (equation 2.8).  Thus for each 
percentage point decline in the unemployment rate the TFP growth rate rises by .83 
percentage points per year, but the growth rate of output per hour increases by this 
amount less an offset of .33 (.22*1.5) due to capital shallowing.  It is the strong 
procyclicality of TFP that keeps labor productivity growth mildly procyclical 
  The argument advanced here is that labor productivity and TFP are both 
procyclical because of the inability of the private business sector to get rid of capital 
in a downturn.  Unlike labor, capital can’t be fired.  It must be held by someone, who 
incurs real holding costs, and real depreciation costs largely unaffected by utilization.  
This involuntary “hoarding” of capital is thus more important than the voluntary 
hoarding of labor in explaining procyclicality in TFP and any tendency in that 
direction for labor productivity.  
Not only are the costs of holding existing capital unavoidable, but for most asset 
categories, total user cost is largely independent of how intensively the stock is used. 
The capital costs of a warehouse, hotel, or an airplane, for example, do not depend 
much on how full each is.9  As a result, as unemployment declines, the average cost 
of capital declines because utilization-invariant depreciation charges and the largely 
fixed costs of holding capital are spread over a larger flow volume of output. The 
productivity dual of these cost reductions is that total factor productivity increases.  
Meanwhile, the effect on output per hour in the aggregate is closer to a wash because 
the rise in TFP is partially offset by the effect on output per hour of the reduction in 
the capital-labor ratio as one approaches potential output from below.   
3.  A Statistical Artifact? 
Is TFP procyclicality a statistical artifact due to the failure to make a cyclical 
adjustment to capital input?  In all of these calculations capital services are proxied by 
estimates of its stock.  Beginning with Solow (1957), a number of economists have 
attempted to make a utilization adjustment for capital when calculating TFP. Solow 
used the unemployment rate for labor as a proxy.   The magnitude of such an 
adjustment may not make much difference if one is interested in long term growth, 
but it can make a big difference if one is concerned with the cyclicality of 
productivity.  In particular, if the cyclical adjustment to capital input is large enough 
it will reduce or even eliminate the finding of procyclicality. 
    Mathew Shapiro (1993), for example, used unpublished data on hours per day 
and days per week of plant operation to adjust capital input in manufacturing.  After 
the adjustment, the procyclicality of measured manufacturing TFP over the period 
1978-88 disappears. The result is not surprising, since reducing capital input in 
recessions, when facilities are operated less intensively, will raise calculated TFP 
levels in troughs.10  But such adjustments are too large.  If any adjustment is 
warranted, it is in the aggregate small, and treating the service flow as proportional to 
capital stock will probably give a better first approximation of economically 
meaningful capital input than the adjusted series suggested by Solow or Shapiro.   
It is important to understand why cyclical adjustments such as those made by 
Solow or Shapiro are too large.  In a non-slave economy, capital and labor are not on 
an equal footing in terms of the options available to business owners in the event of a 
downturn.  Firms may choose, but are not required, to hoard labor.  Insofar as capital 
is concerned, the private business sector is in the same position as were antebellum 
southern plantation owners with respect to their field hands.  The private business 
sector must hold existing capital irrespective of the stage of the business cycle.  It 
can, in principle, adjust the rate of accessioning, but for a variety of reasons, 
including lead times, the estimates in Table 2 show that the growth rate of the capital 
stock is basically acyclical.  
This acyclicality would be less relevant here if the aggregate cost of capital 
fluctuated proportionately with utilization.  But it does not, because the 
preponderance of the user cost of capital is unaffected by utilization.  That proportion 
varies by asset category, but is particularly high for structures, such as warehouses, 
factory buildings, commercial and retail office structures, hotels and apartment 
buildings, railway permanent way, pipelines, telephone landlines and microwave 
installations, and fiber optic cable.11   It should be noted that structures account for a 
large majority of capital assets in the economy.  Since 1925, the first year for which 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides Fixed Asset data, the value of 
structures has never fallen below 80 percent of the value of fixed assets (see Field, 
2009b). 
The majority of the user cost of capital is unaffected by utilitization for other 
asset classes, as well, including producer durables in the transportation sector, such as 
aircraft, railroad rolling stock, busses, and barges.  Even for producer durables for 
which depreciation is a larger portion of the user cost, decisions about when the asset 
has been fully depreciated are largely unrelated to utilization for many assets.  This is 
particularly true for items like computers, cellular telephones and software, where 
technological obsolescence is far more important than how many hours of operation 
the equipment has experienced. 
In the case of durables such as aircraft or vehicles, it is true that depreciation 
will rise with operating hours or miles.  But the relevant output or scale variable is 
passenger or ton-miles, not simply miles.  In an airline system, for example, much of 
the increase in passenger miles as one comes out of recession is accommodated by a 
rise in load factors, not an increase in aircraft operating hours.  Consequently, the rise 
in output as one approaches potential will have little effect on aggregate capital costs.  
The situation is even more dramatic for structures, such as hotels, apartments, 
warehouses, or retail and commercial office buildings.  The user cost of the 
warehouse or the hotel is largely the same whether it is full or half empty.  We can 
attribute the reductions in unit costs as the output gap closes to economies of scale, 
provided we recognize that we are indexing scale to output (cubic meters of goods 
stored, or moved per year), not to a combined input measure.  
Ignoring the possible effect of capital gains and losses, we can, following 
Jorgenson, characterize the annual user cost of capital C as the capital stock K times 
the sum of the interest rate r and the rate of depreciation δ.   
     C = (r + δ)K 
User costs are therefore the sum of rK, the pure cost of holding physical capital, and 
δΚ, depreciation costs.  The first term is entirely unaffected by utilization.  Much 
depreciation is also unrelated to utilization, because it reflects technological 
obsolescence or exposure to the elements, rather than the direct effects of wear and 
tear related to utilization.12 13   
 Since the aggregate annual user cost of holding the existing stock of capital is 
largely unrelated to utilization, and since the growth rate of capital inputs are 
basically acyclical in Table 2, the economy experiences rising output per unit of 
capital and rising TFP as it comes out of a recession.  As aggregate output goes up, 
unit costs go down, principally because the largely fixed costs of holding capital are 
spread over a larger flow volume of output.  Procyclical TFP is not simply a statistical 
artifact produced by failure to make an adequate utilization adjustment to capital 
input.  It is real and economically meaningful. 
 4.  Aggregate Supply and the Cyclical Behavior of TFP 
If in fact the growth rate of TFP has behaved procyclically in the United States, 
there remain differences over how this is to be explained. Real business cycle theory 
provides an alternate account. RBC theorists view business cycles as “small 
deviations in trend” of real output (Kehoe and Prescott, 2008, p. 11), and they view 
productivity shocks, defined as deviations from a detrended TFP series, as the 
impulses causing the cycles (Prescott, 1986).  Rather than demand shocks causing 
short run TFP movements, and this being something one can test empirically, TFP is 
by definition procyclical.     
RBC pioneers such as Lucas and Prescott initially granted that their approach 
was not applicable to major macroeconomic disruptions such as the Great 
Depression.14  But Prescott subsequently changed his mind, influenced, according to 
his own account, by the work of Harold Cole and Lee Ohanian (de Vroey and 
Pensieoroso, 2006). RBC research has now merged into a broader umbrella known as 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) analysis, which includes 
neoKeynesian variants.   
  A unifying precept in RBC modeling is that sources of measured productivity 
change, in both the short and long run, lie outside of economics – in the realm of 
politics or in an independent dynamic of technological advance. If there is a unifying 
feature of the broader DSGE program, it is the insistence on providing strong 
microeconomic foundations for macroeconomic relationships, which has always 
seemed to me more of an aesthetic preference than a scientific imperative.  That said, 
many DSGE models escape from the narrow strictures of the original RBC initiative. 
Some adopt features of macroeconomic research from over half a century ago, 
exploring the influence of monetary or fiscal policy shocks within the context of non-
market clearing imperfections, and returning to an empirical strategy relying on the 
estimation of structural equations rather than calibration (Woodford, 2009).  
Cole and Ohanian, however, see their work as still very much within the 
original RBC tradition, and the assumption that short run TFP fluctuations are 
exogenous is part of their maintained hypothesis.  This is true as well for the broader 
Great Depressions project run by Timothy Kehoe and Edward Prescott at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.15  For the contributors to Kehoe and Prescott (2007), 
the source of the large drops in TFP associated with depressions is to be found in 
technological regress, or, in the absence of plausible candidates, in bad government 
supply side policies.  
In contrast, the view advanced here is that cycles are caused principally by 
aggregate demand fluctuations, with the output gap as proxied by the unemployment 
rate reflecting the strength of negative demand shocks.16   TFP declined with 
recession and depression because as the output gap widened, output fell, but capital 
inputs and costs generally didn’t.  
These approaches involve different understandings of the primary  causes of 
business cycles, differences highlighted in the competing principles used by the 
NBER’s Business Cycle committee in its ex post dating of  cycles.  The committee 
places “substantial weight” on movements in real GDP but acknowledges that one 
can also look at the output gap in which case the unemployment rate would be a 
“critical guide.”17  An RBC perspective leads one to put most weight on the former 
criterion, and indeed some have suggested that cycles can be dated mechanically, and 
a committee is not needed.   
A challenge for the RBC approach, however, is to provide plausible historical 
narratives consistent with the periodic and often substantial declines in TFP 
associated with recessions. Variations in the arrival rate of innovations might account 
for alterations in a positive rate of growth of TFP, but it is more difficult to see how 
such variations would periodically cause it to go negative.18  Data for the years 1890 
through 2004 indicate an average annual rate of private non-farm TFP growth of 1.46 
percent with a standard deviation of over 4 percentage points.  There are many years 
in which TFP didn’t just grow more slowly, it declined, often sharply (see Figure 1).   
(FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE) 
For 1948 and earlier, average annual TFP growth was 1.7 percent per year and 
the standard deviation was 5.4 percent.  TFP declined in 23 of the 58 years:  1893, 
1894, 1896, 1898, 1902, 1904, 1907, 1908, 1910, 1912, 1914, 1917, 1920, 1922, 
1925, 1927, 1930, 1931, 1932, 1933, 1944, 1946, and 1947.  On the face of it, it 
seems unlikely that all of these declines can be attributed to negative technological 
shocks or, absent that, innovations in bad government supply side policy, with the 
implied counterfactual that within a minimalist state they would not have occurred.  
The most striking and problematic declines prior to the Second World War take place 
in 1930, 1931, 1932 and 1933 in the context of the most serious output shortfall in 
U.S. economic history.  12 percentage points of the more than 30 percent drop in real 
output between 1929 and 1933 is attributable to downward movement in TFP.   
In understanding what happened during these years, we have well established 
narratives detailing the effects of collapsing banks, a shrinking money supply, the 
interactions of debt and deflation, and plummeting velocity due to declines in 
spending on consumer durables and investment goods (Bernanke, 1983, Eichengreen, 
1992; Field, 1984; Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; Romer, 1990; Temin, 1976).19 
These accounts differ in terms of their relative emphasis on national and international 
factors, or on monetary vs. velocity shocks, but they reflect a shared view that the 
Great Depression was principally the consequence of aggregate demand shocks. 
Lee Ohanian (2009) has suggested that a meeting with President Hoover in 
November of 1929 persuaded industrialists to maintain high real wages in 
manufacturing, and that this explains part of the shrinkage in that sector through 
1931.  Much of the drop took place in durables and there is considerable evidence that 
overextended, overindebted, and uncertain consumers cut back sharply on this 
category of their spending (Mishkin, 1978; Romer, 1990).  To this can be added the 
decline in orders attributable to the drop in the producer durables portion of 
investment expenditure.20  These should be considered the primary causes of the drop 
in manufacturing up through the banking crisis of October 1931.  At best, a failure of 
nominal wages to decline faster can be seen as an institutional factor contributing to 
the nonneutrality of a negative aggregate demand shock. 
Moreover, a more rapid decline in nominal wages in manufacturing – Ohanian’s 
posited counterfactual – would have worsened the debt deflation problem.    There is 
nothing in the modeling to capture the threat posed to output and employment by 
deflation in a world in which most borrowing and lending involved instruments with 
fixed nominal repayment obligations.  There are many institutional features of an 
economy that can contribute to nonneutrality, and, as both our historical and current 
experience with financial fragility indicates, it is far from clear that the most 
significant of these are in the labor market. 
The other shocks emphasized by Cole and Ohanian, such as the National 
Industrial Recovery Act or the National Labor Relations Act, all took place after 
1933, during a period of very rapid TFP growth (see Figure 1). At best they could 
account for why TFP growth wasn’t even faster.  They could not have played a role in 
the cumulative 12 percent decline in TFP under President Hoover.   
Russian/Soviet GDP and, presumably, TFP, declined sharply after 1913 and did 
not reattain its prewar level until 1926.  But an historical narrative can point to large 
negative supply shocks, including the disastrous participation of the Russians in the 
First World War, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (which reduced Russian territory), the 
March 1917 Revolution, the October 1917 Bolshevik revolution, the Civil War 
between the Reds and the Whites, foreign intervention, and the political turmoil 
associated with the death of Lenin and the rise of Stalin.21  We lack such a narrative 
for the productivity declines during the worst years of the Depression.   The most 
plausible explanation for TFP declines during this period – and most others -- is that 
demand shocks widened the output gap, and as the output gap widened, output fell, 
while capital input and cost largely didn’t. 
For the 1948-2004 period, average TFP growth is lower and less variable.  The 
mean growth rate is 1.4 percent with a standard deviation of 1.8 percent.  The reduced 
cyclical volatility of TFP during this period is arguably because cycles were weaker, 
at least between the 1982 recession and the 2007-09 downturn. In the quarter century 
prior to 2008, the U.S. economy experienced only two relatively minor recessions. 
Even with a lower ratio of standard deviation to mean, however, the level of TFP, not 
just its rate of growth, declined in 1954, 1956, 1969, 1970, 1974, 1979, 1980, 1981, 
1982, and 1991.  
For the postwar period, however, there is a plausible source of negative supply 
shocks, particularly between 1972 and 1985.  Sharp increases in the price of oil 
resulting from political decisions made by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries produced deteriorations in the efficiency of the machine (foreign trade) 
whereby the United States transformed wheat, soybeans, plywood and aircraft into 
oil. Prior to mid century, when the U.S. was still the world’s largest oil producer, oil 
shocks are of little relevance in understanding the aggregate economy.  And, in part 
because of controls, there is relatively little change in the real price of a barrel of 
crude oil from the end of the Second World War through 1970. Between December 
1973 and January 1974, however, the price more than doubled as a direct 
consequence of OPEC actions.  And in April of 1979, the price began rapidly rising.  
Following a peak in April of 1980, at which point it had more than doubled from a 
year earlier, it began a steady decline before bottoming out in 1985.  Aside from a 
brief spike during the first Gulf War, it then remained relatively steady until after 
2005. 
(TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE) 
Table 3 reports an additional regression for the post war period.  The dependent 
variable, as in Table 1, is the rate of change of TFP.  Equation 3.1 adds the level of 
real oil prices in 2008 dollars to the change in the unemployment rate on the right 
hand side. This regression shows that oil prices do have a negative impact on TFP 
growth rates. But the size of its coefficient is quite small, and not statistically 
significant.   Independently of fluctuations in the output gap, a $10 increase in the real 
price of a barrel of crude subtracts less than a quarter of a percentage point from the 
TFP growth rate.   
It is commonly argued that, in contrast with 1980 or 1981-82, the 1974-75 
recession was made in Vienna and Riyadh, rather than Washington.  It was 1974-75, 
after all, that turned the Philips curve into an unidentified flying object. Still, the 
Federal Funds rate, which was under 5 percent as late as September 1972, was more 
than twice that a year later, and remained above 10 percent between July 1973 and 
November of 1973 and then again between April and October of 1974.  The role that 
monetary stringency played in inducing this recession has been perhaps underplayed.  
It was clearly implicated in the  decline in investment spending which marked this 
recession as well as so many others.   
The proportional increase in the real price of oil was larger in 1979-80 than 
what occurred between December of 1973 and January of 1974, although its 
disruptive impact was less because, as a consequence of the first oil price shock, the 
U.S. economy had begun moving towards a more energy efficient capital stock.  A 
review of the sequence of oil price, interest rate, and unemployment rate movements 
between 1979 and 1982 helps explain why, in spite of the second oil price shock, the 
recessions of 1980 and 1981-82 are almost universally attributed to changes in 
aggregate demand conditions resulting from the tightening of monetary policy 
engineered by Chairman Volcker to fight inflation. 
    (FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE) 
Even before the real price of oil began its year long upward movement in April 
of 1979, the Federal Funds rate began a climb into historically unprecedented 
territory.  Following the seven month period in 1974 when it had exceeded 10 
percent, the rate declined to a trough in January of 1977 at 4.71 percent, then began a 
gradual upward movement.  In December of 1978 it broke 10 percent again, hit 11.4 
percent in September of 1979, and then 13.8 percent in October, when Chairman 
Volcker announced a new monetary regime in which the Fed would target monetary 
aggregates, and allow the funds rate to seek its own level.  By April of 1980 the rate 
had increased to an eye-popping 17.61 percent.   
Unemployment began to rise sharply, from 6.3 percent in March of 1980 to a 
peak of 7.8 percent in July.  Concerned that the unprecedented monetary stringency 
would take the real economy into a major recession, the Fed relented, slashing the 
funds rate by almost half to a low of 9 percent in July of 1980.  In reaction to 
monetary easing, the unemployment rate stopped rising, and remained in a range of 
7.2-7.6 percent through September of 1981. 
In the meantime, however, reconsidering the impact of its easing on inflationary 
expectations in both the bond and labor markets, the Fed again allowed the funds rate 
to move upward. It reached a new and unprecedented peak of 19.1 percent in January 
of 1981.  The rate dropped to 14 percent in April but then rose again to 19.1 percent 
in June.  In July of 1981 the unemployment rate began a relentless year and a half rise 
to a peak of 10.8 percent in November and December of 1982, as of this writing still 
the highest unemployment rate experienced since the Great Depression. 
Economists such as Robert Lucas, pioneers of rational expectations modeling, 
had predicted that we could have costless disinflation but were proved wrong.   The 
rise in the unemployment rate from 7.2 percent in July of 1981 to its peak of 10.8 
percent a year and a half later can’t be attributed to negative supply shocks.  The real 
price of oil had been declining steadily since April of 1980.  The level of total factor 
productivity dropped .7 percent in 1979, 2.2 percent in 1980, .4 percent in 1981, and 
3.6 percent in 1982.   
With the possible exception of 1974-75, the most serious economic downturns 
of the twentieth century were precipitated by aggregate demand shocks. In most 
instances it is the linkage running from aggregate demand to the output gap that 
generates the negative TFP movements associated with recession.   
 
5. Conclusion 
Receptivity to procyclical TFP as a stylized feature of US growth has been 
influenced by macroeconomic theorists placing greater emphasis on aggregate supply, 
and by empirical investigations involving relatively short data runs usually limited to 
the manufacturing sector.  The regressions discussed in sections 1 and 2 cover more 
than a century, and are broad in coverage, examining data for the U.S. private 
nonfarm economy, which has typically accounted for about three fourths of GDP (the 
declining share of agriculture and the rising share of government have kept the PNE 
share roughly stable).  Manufacturing has contributed a declining share of U.S. GDP, 
particularly since the 1970s. Even at its high point in the mid-century decades,  that 
share barely exceeded a third, and today it contributes less than a sixth..22 Although 
data for the sector is more detailed than that available for the rest of the economy, 
trends within the sector do not necessarily offer an accurate guide to what is 
happening in the economy as a whole. 
These regressions show that although labor productivity is weakly procyclical, 
approaching acyclicality after 1973, there is a stable and systematic relationship 
between the business cycle, as manifested in the unemployment rate, and total factor 
productivity that has endured for over a century.  A decline of one percentage point in 
the unemployment rates adds about .9 percent to the TFP growth rate, irrespective of 
whether the trend growth rate is fast or slow.   
The paper rejects the argument of Shapiro and others that the TFP findings are a 
statistical artifact.  It explains procyclicality as resulting principally from demand 
shocks interacting with capital services which are relatively invariant over the cycle.  
The gains in total factor productivity as one comes out of a recession are real.  They 
represent short run increasing returns to scale, as hotels, warehouses, transportation 
systems and other capital assets experience higher load factors.   
Real business cycle models provide an alternate account of  procyclicality, in 
which deviations in TFP from trend are cause, not consequence if business cycles.  
But RBC proponents have difficulty providing compelling narratives consistent with 
the observation that TFP often declines during recessions, rather than simply 
experiencing growth retardation.  
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Dependent Variable:   ∆TFP a 
 
 
Eq. No.  Years n Constant     ∆UR b UR c   R2    
 
(1.1) 1929-41 12         .0283        - .0092 .647  
           (3.02)            (-4.28) 
 
(1.2) 1900-41 41         .0197        - .0091 .337  
           (2.83)           (-4.45) 
 
(1.3) 1900-48 48         .0175        - .0091 .307  
           (2.65)           (-4.52) 
 
(1.4) 1890-1948 58         .0166        - .0084 .289  
           (2.75)           (-4.77) 
 
(1.5) 1890-1948d 58         .0165        - .0103 .255 
           (2.68)            (-4.38) 
 
(1.6) 1948-73 26         .0195        - .0082 .294 
           (6.51)           (-3.16) 
 
(1.7) 1973-95 23         .0053        - .0098  .319 
           (1.57)            (-3.14) 
 
(1.8) 1948-2004 56         .0129        - .0083 .235 
           (6.08)           (-4.11) 
 
(1.9) 1890-2004 114         .0148        - .0084 .283 
           (4.59)            (-6.65) 
 
(1.10) 1890-2004e 114         .0148        - .0100 .252 
           (4.50)            (-6.14)                               
 
(1.11) 1890-2004 114         .0105        - .0087  .0006      .288  
           (1.79)            (-6.64)           (.889) 
 
 
Note:  t statistics in parentheses. 
 
 
a  ∆TFP is the difference in the natural log of TFP from one year to the next.  It is thus 
a measure of the continuously compounded annual rate of increase of total factor 
productivity. 
b  ∆UR is the change in the unemployment rate in percentage points from year t-1 to 
year t. 
c UR is the level of the unemployment rate in year t. 
d   Uses Weir rather than Lebergott unemployment data 
e  Uses Weir unemployment data through 1948, BLS thereafter. 
 
 
Sources and notes.    All data are for the private nonfarm economy.  The convention is 
to calculate the 1947-48 growth rate from historical data (Kendrick, Lebergott, or 
Weir) and to calculate the 1948-49 growth rate from Bureau of Labor Statistics data.   
Each growth rate is calculated as the change in the natural log from year t-1 to year t.  
The dependent variables are therefore logged and differenced, mitigating 
autocorrelation problems; Durbin-Watson statistics are within acceptable ranges. The 
change in the unemployment rate is the change in percentage points between year t-1 
and year t. 
Total Factor Productivity data for 1890-1948 are from  Kendrick (1961, Table A-
XXIII);  data for 1948-2004 are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Net Multifactor 
Productivity and Cost, 1948-2008, SIC 1948-87 linked to NAICS 1987-2008” release 
of May 6, 2009.   Variant 1 of the unemployment rate for 1890-1948 is from 
Lebergott (1964) and variant 2 for 1890-1948 is from Weir (1992).  The 
unemployment rates for 1948-2004 comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
“Employment Status of the Civilian Noninstitutional Population. 1940 to Date,” 
available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat1.pdf , accessed on August 14, 2009.   




Dependent Variable:   ∆Y/N 
 
Eq. No.  Years n Constant     ∆UR    R2   
  
 
(2.1) 1890-1948 58         .0210        - .0052 .139 
           (3.58)            (-3.01) 
 
(2.2) 1948-73 26         .0253        - .0060 .189 
           (8.68)            (-2.37) 
 
(2.3) 1973-2004 32         .0154       - .0028     .009 
           (5.69)           (-1.12) 
 
(2.4) 1890-2004 114         .0203        - .0051 .133 
           (6.48)           (-4.15) 
 
 
Dependent Variable:   ∆K/N 
 
Eq. No.  Years n Constant     ∆UR    R2    
 
(2.5) 1948-2004 56         .0275          .0190 .727 
           (16.65)          (12.10) 
 
(2.6) 1890-1948 58         .0121          .0147 .738 
           (3.02)            (12.57) 
 
(2.7) 1900-41 41         .0073          .0162 .805 
           (1.67)            (12.68) 
 
(2.8) 1890-2004 114         .0195          .0151 .713 
           (8.49)            (16.70) 
 
 
Dependent Variable:   ∆N 
 
Eq. No.  Years n Constant     ∆UR    R2    
 
(2.9) 1890-1948 58         .0163       - .0152  .741 
           (7.53)            (-17.88) 
 
(2.10) 1948-2004 56         .0164        - .0213 .872 
           (14.18)           (-19.36) 
 
(2.11) 1890-2004 114         .0163        - .0152 ..741 
           (7.53)            (-17.88) 
 
Dependent Variable:   ∆K 
 
 
Eq. No.  Years n Constant     ∆UR    R2    
 
(2.12) 1890-2004 114         .0346        - .0001 .000 
           (18.08)           (-.167) 
 
(2.13) 1948-2004 56         .0416       - .0029  .071 
           (27.93)          (-2.04) 
 
(2.14) 1890-48 58         .0283        - .0001 .000 




Dependent Variable:   ∆Y/K 
 
 
Eq. No.  Years n Constant     ∆UR    R2    
 
(2.15) 1890-2004 114         .0020         - .0200 .654 
           (0.61)           (-14.52) 
 
(2.16) 1948-2004 56        -.0052       - .0212  .579 
           (-.2.00)            (-8.70) 
 
(2.17) 1890-48 58         .0090        - .0199 .671 




Dependent Variable:   ∆Y 
 
 
Eq. No.  Years n Constant     ∆UR    R2    
 
(2.18) 1890-2004 114         .0366          -.0203 .690 
           (11.20)           (-15.81) 
 
(2.19) 1948-2004 56         .0361       - .02458 .777 
           (18.38)         (-13.84) 
 
(2.20) 1890-48 58         .0373        - .0198 .684 




Sources and notes:  ∆Y, ∆N and ∆K are defined as the change in the natural log of 
output, hours, and capital input respectively between year t-1 and year t. They are 
thus a measure of the continuously compounded growth rate of these variables from 
one year to the next.  ∆Y/N is the difference between the growth rate of output and 
the growth rate of hours; it is thus a measure of the growth rate of labor productivity. 
∆K/N is the difference between the growth rate of capital and the growth rate of 
hours; it measures the growth of the capital-labor ratio.  ∆Y/K is the difference 
between the growth rate of output and the growth rate of capital.  It measures of the 
growth rate of capital productivity (the inverse of the capital output ratio). ∆UR is the 
change in the unemployment rate measured in percentage points 
Data for real output, capital services, and labor hours for the private non-farm 
economy for 1890-1948 are from  Kendrick, 1961, Table A-XXIII;  for 1948-2004, 
they are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Net Multifactor Productivity and Cost, 






Dependent Variable:   ∆TFP  
 
 
Eq. No.  Years n Constant     ∆UR  Oil    R2    
 
(3.1) 1946-2004 58         .0185        - .0098        -.00021 .303 
           (3.82)            (-4.48)             (-1.62) 
 
 
Sources:  ∆TFP and ∆UR:  See Table 1 
             Oil:  Real Price of a barrel of Crude Oil, annual data.  Deflation is based on 
the Consumer Price Index, urban.  Values are in November 2008 dollars. 
http://www.inflationdata.com/inflation/Inflation_Rate/Historical_Oil_Prices_Table.as
p , accessed October 24, 2009.      
 




























































































































































































Fed Funds Civ UR, SA Real Oil Price
Figure 2 
Sources:  Monthly Real Oil Price.  Nominal is Spot Oil Price, West Texas Intermediate, 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/OILPRICE , accessed October 24, 2009.  
Deflator is CPI-U, Seasonally Adjusted, 1982-84 =100, http://www.bea.gov, 
accessed October 24, 2009.   Plotted data are half the values in 1982-4 dollars.  
Federal Funds rate:  http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/FEDFUNDS.txt  , accessed 
October 24, 2009.  Left hand scale is percent 
Civilian Unemployment rate, seasonally adjusted:  http://www.bls.gov , accessed October 




                                                 
1 These conclusions are robust to substituting the pre-1948 unemployment series 
generated by Weir (1992) for the Lebergott numbers which continue to be used by most 
researchers. 
2 In the text, coefficient estimates are multiplied  by 100 so they can be interpreted in 
percent per year terms. 
3 Personal communication from Paul David, November 2, 2008.   
4 Kehoe and Prescott “hypothesize that the growth rate [in the stock of knowledge] is two 
percent per year” (2008, p. 10).   Their estimate is roughly half a percentage point higher 
than the estimates of 1.5 percent per year suggested by the constant terms  in the 1890-
2004 regressions in equations 1.9-1.11 in Table 1. 
5 A JSTOR search shows almost all articles referencing the phenomenon appearing after 
1995.  
6 Basu and Fernald , for example, take it as a given that both TFP and labor productivity 
are procyclical.  “Productivity is procyclical. That is, whether measured as labor 
productivity or total factor productivity, productivity rises in booms and falls in 
recessions” (2000, p. 1). Data for the private nonfarm economy, however, show labor 
productivity approaching acyclicality after 1973 (see Table 2). The more robust empirical 
regularity is the procyclicality of TFP. 
7 The simple correlation between the unemployment rate and the BEA’s chain type 
quantity index for investment in private fixed asset (Table 6.8 in the Fixed Asset Tables, 
available at http://www.bea.gov, accessed on August 16, 2009) is -.14. 
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8 Capital shallowing, the opposite of deepening, refers to situations in which the capital-
labor ratio declines. 
9 This second effect applies equally to variable capital:  the holding costs of a stock of 
wholesale or retail inventory is invariant to how frequently it turns over.  For a similar 
analysis, which places more emphasis on the market power which is the logical 
concomitant of large fixed capital installations, see Hall (1988).  See also Field (1987). 
10 Basu and Fernald (2000, p. 35)) also make utilization adjustments that reduce the 
procyclicality of TFP.  Their adjustments, designed to correct for utilization of both labor 
and capital, are based on sectoral data on changes in hours worked per worker, combined 
with the assumption that these data proxy both for unmeasured changes in the intensity of 
work and the “workweek of capital” (flow of capital services).  The adjustment 
applicable to capital is, however, too large. The capital stock is dominated by structures, 
and the service flow contributed by a warehouse or hotel is largely invariant to how full 
or empty they are, let alone to how many hours employees within them work. 
11 In spite of a rise in the share of equipment, structures remain dominant today within the 
US private fixed asset stock, as they were throughout the twentieth century.  In 2007, 
total private fixed assets comprised $33.4 trillion, with equipment and software totaling 
only $5.3 trillion.  Nonresidential structures accounted for $10.2 trillion; the remainder 
was residential structures.  http://www.bea.gov, Fixed Asset Table 2.1 accessed June 22, 
2009.  For historical data, see Field (1985).    
12 Hall, 1988, p. 923, makes a similar assumption about depreciation. 
13 The rate of deterioration (depreciation) of a tar and gravel roof on a warehouse is 
independent of how much is stored inside it.   
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14 “…the Great Depression [. . . ] remains a formidable barrier to a completely unbending 
application of the view that business cycles  are all alike” (Lucas, 1980, p. 273).  RBC 
theorists have also had little to say about the 2007-10 financial crisis and recession. 
15 De Cordoba and Kehoe (2009, p. 2) summarize the contributions of Kehoe and Prescott 
(2007).:  “The authors of each of the studies … start by decomposing the decline in 
output during the depression into declines in inputs of labor and capital and a decline in 
the efficiency with which these factors are employed, measured as productivity. They 
find that a large drop in productivity always plays a large role in accounting for the 
depression.”  “Accounting for” means here more than simply contributing to in an 
arithmetical sense.  It means causing.  Most economists are comfortable with this 
interpretation for long term analysis.  The differences involve its applicability to short 
term cyclical fluctuations.   
16 The rationale is the close and systematic relationship between the unemployment rate 
and the output gap, first identified by Arthur Okun and known colloquially as Okun’s 
Law (Okun, 1962). 
17In its document “The NBER Business Cycle Dating Procedures”,  the Bureau 
committee responsible for dating cycles notes: “While the NBER has traditionally placed 
substantial weight on output measures, one could instead define expansions and 
recessions in terms of whether the fraction of the economy’s productive resources that is 
being used is rising or falling (in which case the behavior of the unemployment rate 
would be a critical guide to whether the economy was in expansion or recession), or in 
terms of whether the quantity of productive resources being used was rising or falling (in 
which case employment would be a critical indicator). Either of these alternative 
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definitions is defensible…”  In response to a FAQ about the 2001 recession, and why 
more emphasis was not placed on trends in the unemployment rate and employment in 
determining its end, the document simply states that to have dated it in this fashion would 
have been “inconsistent with the procedures it had used to date earlier recessions” (Hall 
et. al, 2003, p. 7). 
18 As Rebelo (2005, p. 9)  has written, “Macroeconomists generally agree that expansions 
in output, at least in the medium to long run, are driven by TFP increases that derive from 
technical progress. In contrast, the notion that recessions are caused by TFP declines 
meets with substantial skepticism because, interpreted literally, it means that recessions 
are times of technological regress.”   
19 The literature is voluminous; these references are illustrative.  . 
20 In nominal terms investment in producer durables dropped by more than half between 
1929 and 1931 ($5.5 to $2.6 billion). Consumption spending on durables dropped 40 
percent, from $9.8 to $5.5 billion.  Spending on nondurables dropped less than a quarter 
and on services less than 15 percent. http://www.bea.gov, NIPA Table 1.1.5, accessed 
October 25, 2009. 
 
21 For other examples of negative TFP growth, see Baier, Dwyer, and Tamura (2006).   
22 Manufacturing’s share of national income averaged 30.6 percent between 1941 and 
1960.  The share declined modestly in the 1960s and then more rapidly beginning in the 
1970s (Carter et al., 2006, Series Ca35 and Ca41).  
 43
